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REPORT OF THE ROUNDTABLE ON 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY
Introduction
The Roundtable on Telecommunications and the Knowledge Society was held on 26 May 
2006 at the ECLAC Subregional Headquarters for the Caribbean in Port-of-Spain.
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago has articulated a 15-year national development 
plan which, among other things, has set as a target the attainment of “Developed-Nation Status” . 
The plan, “Vision 2020”, not only acknowledges the fundamental role that the application and 
development of Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) will play, but more 
importantly, recognizes the critical need to transform Trinidad and Tobago into a Knowledge 
Society. Additionally, as a signatory to several international agreements, including the General 
Agreement of Trade-in-Services (GATS), the government also acknowledges its commitments, 
including, the full liberalization of the telecommunications sector.
The Roundtable was convened against this backdrop. Targeted to telecommunications 
decision- and policy-makers from government, industry and academia, the forum provided an 
opportunity to engage technical and expert dialogue on the issue of telecommunications 
regulation; to facilitate the exchange of views on the regulatory issues which challenge the full 
liberalization of the sector; and, using the experiences of other jurisdictions, stimulate 
appropriate analysis and rethink. To facilitate the debate, the Roundtable was divided into four 
substantive sessions.
Session 1: Transforming Trinidad and Tobago into a Knowledge Society
In differentiating a Knowledge Society from an Information Society, Dr. Kim Mallalieu 
posited that a knowledge society was one which placed value on knowledge as the means of 
realizing economic and social well-being. There was the recognition that in such a society, 
citizens had greater choice and opportunity, deeper social integration and longer life expectancy. 
Inquiry, research, creativity, the use of modern technology and entrepreneurial leadership were 
shown to be of great importance. As a result, the critical skills which must be harnessed include 
literacy, collaboration, innovation, communication, diversity and flexibility. In contrast, 
information-based innovations were featured as tools for productivity and entertainment in an 
Information Society, with little or no concern for assimilation, integration nor the application of 
understanding to innovations.
In the context of Trinidad and Tobago’s Vision 2020 plan, Dr. Mallalieu contended that 
many of the prerequisites of a knowledge society were included. She argued that the Draft 
National Strategic Plan provided for adequate infrastructure, a vibrant and productive business 
sector, an absence of traditional obstacles to access, meaningful and appropriate services, and 
purpose-driven innovations.
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Acknowledging that abundant and affordable Internet access, computers in schools and 
community access to eGovernment services did not make a Knowledge Society, the panelist 
countered the need for the provision of innovative opportunities for engagement of individuals at 
all levels of society. Connectivity to people was seen to be as equally important as connectivity 
to the Internet and knowledge sources. That was identified as being crucial to government’s 
quest to transform Trinidad and Tobago into a Knowledge Society.
In response to the presentation, several issues were discussed. Among them, was the 
challenge of how to value and market knowledge. It was recognized that while information 
could be codified, knowledge could not, since it was expressed in the presence of information, 
thought and cognizance. To establish value for knowledge, one, therefore, had to recognize 
diversities, capabilities of interest and inclinations. Ultimately, giving citizens purpose and 
opportunities for personal engagement was suggested as the way to attach value.
It was acknowledged that the creation of a knowledge society did not equate to human 
development. The typical diffusion of ICT in developing countries was not seen to be getting to 
the heart of the issue. In particular, models which incorporated initiatives such as the provision 
of computers within primary schools, and tax concessions on computer purchases, brought 
citizens into a space that was not always relevant to them.
Further, tacit knowledge was viewed as being of particular importance in human 
development. Knowledge was viewed as a protected resource that was capable of providing a 
competitive advantage. It was, therefore recognized that a challenge existed where a culture shift 
needed to occur within the society, from one of hording to one of knowledge sharing.
Session 2: Spectrum Management in Small Island Developing States (SIDS)
Within the past two decades, there has been a significant increase in the demand for 
frequency spectrum. Among the primary drivers of the increased demand were the growth in 
mobile communications and other telecommunications innovations, including terrestrial and 
satellite-based digital broadcasting, new defense capabilities, and new safety of life applications.1 
As a result, spectrum was viewed as a finite national resource which had to be effectively 
managed.
It had also been widely accepted that the resource had tremendous value to the national 
economy. Evidence of that was the experience of the United Kingdom in their 2000 auction of 
spectrum for the provision of 3G services.2 The auctioned spectrum was awarded to five 
licensees, and raised approximately GBP 23 billion, in the first instance.
Within that context, Mr. Selby Wilson shared with participants the evolution which had 
occurred in wireless technologies since their introduction at the turn of the twentieth century, 
particularly the minimized interference and increased levels of usage efficiency which now 
existed. As a result, radio frequency spectrum is used to provide a myriad of services in defense,
1 Cave, Martin. 2005. Spectrum Management -  Case Study on the United Kingdom. ITU
2 Also known as Universal Mobile Telecommunications System or “UMTS”.
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industrial, commercial and consumer sectors. Unfortunately, he noted that the legislative and 
regulatory structures within the Caribbean were largely based on obsolete technologies and did 
not facilitate the new spectrum needs. As a result, impractical and inefficient methods of 
spectrum management were typically deployed.
In that context, he identified several challenges which the SIDS of the Caribbean were 
particularly vulnerable to. Among them were the inadequate institutional arrangements for 
dealing with evolving spectrum issues, which were as a direct result of the proliferation of 
wireless technologies; insufficient information on appropriate best practices; and a lack of 
coordination of spectrum management within the Caribbean. Altogether, a case was made from 
the harmonization of policies and techniques for spectrum management in the Caribbean.
The Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU) had in fact recommended such a 
framework as part of its response to a mandate from the Caribbean Ministers of 
Telecommunications, which called for the establishment of a Spectrum Management Task Force. 
The Framework will provide regional regulatory and policy consistency, and was expected to 
facilitate an enabling environment, which would eliminate barriers to the smooth functioning of 
the CSME. Costs and other obstacles which limit the introduction of new entrants into the 
telecommunications market would be eliminated, thereby encouraging increased private sector 
investment, as regional markets become more liberalized.
In conclusion, he noted several advantages which were anticipated from the harmonized 
approach:
1. Minimized inter-service interference among jurisdictions;
2. Ensured compatibility of services among countries;
3. Reduced cost of terminal equipment due to economies of scale;
4. Greater consumer satisfaction and flexibility in the use of terminal equipment;
5. Simplified type approval and equipment certification processes;
6. Unified Caribbean voice at international forums, such as the World Radio 
Conference.
There was support for the establishment of the Framework from participants, who noted 
that although the region fell within Region 2 of the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU) Table of Frequency Allocation, most jurisdictions were in fact in violation of that 
allocation. Further, it was noted that while most of the Caribbean was defined in Region 2, the 
French island territories operated in Region 1, further adding to the challenges of interference, 
including spillover signals effects from neighbouring jurisdictions. These factors impacted on 
equipment purchases.
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Session 3: The regulatory role of the Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and
Tobago: Issues and challenges
The Telecommunications Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (TATT) was established as 
an independent regulator in July 2004, with one of its key objectives being the liberalization of 
the telecommunications sector. Dr. John Prince noted that the established legal and regulatory 
framework provided that TATT was responsible for granting licenses, while the Minister was 
responsible for making policy and granting concessions.
One of the challenges the Authority faced at the assumption of duties was the need to 
draft appropriate regulatory instruments. That need was probably best highlighted by the 
negative effects of not having a spectrum management policy. He noted that spectrum, as a 
national resource, had an economic function and value. There had been inconsistencies in the 
pricing policy, with many investors not required to pay for its use.
The Authority was, therefore, in the process of developing several regulatory instruments, 
including:
1. Consumer rights and obligations policy and regulations;
2. Quality of service policy and regulations;
3. Competition policy and regulations;
4. Pricing policy and regulations;
5. Enforcement, compliance and dispute resolution framework;
6. Universality framework;
7. Number portability.
In the liberalized environment in which Trinidad and Tobago had been operating, he 
noted that the Authority faced several other challenges. One of them was an insufficient human 
resources pool and the need to devise ways of making optimum use of the telecommunications 
talents in the country. He also recognized the need for the Authority to maintain its 
independence, particularly noting that the institution had to be blind in terms of race, colour, 
class and creed.
On the issue of liberalization and competition, there was discussion on the implications of 
allowing the market to determine the economic value of spectrum. It was felt that as a result of 
the high cost of spectrum, local companies were especially disadvantaged. In response, Dr. 
Prince noted that one of the implications of globalization was that if  one was to maintain 
competitive relevance, increased levels of efficiency by service providers would be required.
There was also discussion on the number of competitors which Trinidad and Tobago 
could support. In the area of mobile communications, for example, given its smallness, the 
question was asked as to whether liberalization had been truly successful. It was suggested that 
the competitive forces at play were largely instigated out of a fear of the aggressiveness of only 
one new entrant into the market. Unanswered, was the question of whether real competition 
could occur within a market of primarily two players.
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Taking into consideration ICT for Development, it was recognized that the measure of 
success for the Authority, in response to the infrastructure which it provided, was the societal 
changes as measured against the Human Development Index. In that regard, while universal 
access was attainable, the Authority’s emphasis was rather on the delivery of universal service, 
where the combination of knowledge and infrastructure facilitated a better way of living.
Session 4: The implications of OFCOM’s strategic review of telecommunications
Professor Martin Fransman reviewed the British experience with the liberalization of its 
telecommunications industry. Prior to 1984, when competition was introduced, there was a 
widely-held view that telecommunications would best be provided on a monopolistic basis.
The new regulator, the Office of Communications (OFCOM), was of the view that 
competition had not been adequately working in the United Kingdom. The incumbent operator 
continued to exercise significant market power which resulted in conflicts with its competitors. 
By introducing the concept of equivalence to the regulatory equation, OFCOM had been able to 
resolve those conflicts to the satisfaction of all parties. In particular, the incumbent’s wholesale 
products were offered to competitors and the retail division of the incumbent at the same terms 
and conditions. That new regulatory framework leveled the playing field, and facilitated access 
to the incumbent’s bottleneck access network.
In that context, Professor Fransman highlighted several of the relevant regulatory 
principles which informed OFCOM’s approach. They included:
1. Promoting competition at the deepest levels of infrastructure, that is, as close to 
the final user as possible;
2. Delivering equality of access, particularly at points of bottleneck;
3. Withdrawing regulation where there was sufficient competition;
4. Promoting a favourable climate for efficiency, timely investment, and
technological innovation, through consistent and transparent regulation;
5. Varying the regulatory solution as required, for example, adopting a “light touch
economic regulation” based on competition law and the promotion of 
interoperability.
There was a query regarding the measures which could be taken by SIDS to ensure that a 
truly competitive environment develops. In response, Professor Fransman noted that the issues 
of high fixed costs and economies of scale typically arose in small markets. However, Japan and 
Korea were doing well because of the tough competition which existed with their respective 
incumbents. With reference to the minimum number of market players, he further suggested that 
three local service providers may not be enough to foster true competition.
In conclusion, Professor Fransman noted that OFCOM’s strategic review highlighted the 
importance for regulators to be completely clear on what they were trying to accomplish, and the 
manner in which players were to be judged. He questioned whether competition was an end in
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itself or a means to an end. In the context of desiring competition to realize lower prices, he 
posited that it was both, where competition provided the incentive to innovate.
Conclusion
This Roundtable provided an opportunity to examine the role of telecommunications 
regulation, and in particular spectrum management, in the liberalization thrust. It contextualized 
the discussion in terms of the attainment of a Knowledge Society for Trinidad and Tobago. The 
experiences of OFCOM with regard to the issue of equivalence were instructive. The quality of 
the debate underscored the timeliness of this Roundtable, and suggested the need to embark on 
similar national experiences in other member States.
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A pleasant good morning to all and many thanks to ECLAC for the invitation to 
participate in this morning’s round table. I have been asked to share my thoughts on 
Transforming Trinidad and Tobago into a knowledge society - a particularly onerous task 
as the topic is as broad as it is deep and also because many of its avenues are littered with 
platitudes, clichés and fluff. Nevertheless, the topic is an important one and here I am.
My explorations will surround the following questions:
• What is a knowledge society?
• What are the prerequisites for transformation to a knowledge society?
• What is Trinidad and Tobago’s vision for itself as a knowledge society?
• What are Trinidad and Tobago’s realities?
What is a Knowledge Society?
A knowledge society is one which places an explicit and principal value on knowledge as 
the means to achieve economic and social well being. It is one which features knowledge 
prominently among the basic needs of all of its citizens and wills all citizens to engage 
productively with knowledge. In such a society, knowledge represents a core national 
value: the means through which the citizens achieve (i) greater choice and opportunity 
(ii) deeper social integration and (iii) longer life expectancy, each across very many 
dimensions.
A knowledge society is quite different from an information society, only in part reflecting 
the distinction between the fundamental entities of information (that is, raw content) and 
knowledge (that is, the assimilation, integration and understanding of various 
information sources for re-use). Whereas an information society is one which happens to 
strongly feature information-based innovations as tools for productivity and 
entertainment, a knowledge society is one which additionally counts these tools among 
the basic needs of all citizens. A knowledge society sits at the pinnacle of the 
developmental food chain: above agricultural, industrial and information societies 
respectively.
The notion of a knowledge society occupies a prominent space in the global development 
discourse yet it has been fashioned by a number of converging, and in part conflicting, 
phenomena. The enabling technology dynamic pivots around staggering innovations that 
have yielded unbelievable capabilities to find, navigate, retrieve, organize, repurpose, 
simulate, create, process, apply, preserve, manage secure and most importantly, 
communicate information.
These capabilities have naturally spawned a level of intellectual imperialism that recalls 
Drucker’s prediction that the “acquisition and distribution of formal knowledge” could 
occupy the place which “acquisition and distribution of property and income” had 
occupied for centuries. Of course, today comprehensive policy, legal and regulatory 
instruments are necessary to manage intellectual real estate; and social capital is globally 
recognized as hard core currency. These assets of intellectual property and social capital
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are together recognized as key enablers of competitiveness: competitiveness at the 
organizational, national and global levels.
Yet at the same time, these very technological innovations have enabled new 
collaborative methodologies while organizational and educational theorists have 
promoted the gains of collaborative work. Quite naturally, then, communities of interest 
have emerged which collaborate for competitiveness using ICTs.
As the interesting technological and intellectual dynamics have converged at this very 
time in history, they have been accompanied by an even more interesting societal 
dynamic. This one pivots around a largely shared global awakening to the impact of 
poverty on political sustainability, economic stability and moral conscience. This 
awakening has motivated the articulation of the MDGs and occupied the attention of a 
great many developmental theorists and practitioners. It has given deeper significance to 
concepts such as equity: equity not only with regard to economic parameters such as raw 
income but also access to health care, sanitation, clean drinking water, information, 
education, etc etc. Its hallmarks are community and commons which, for many countries 
around the world, is less familiar than competition and competitiveness.
And out of this melee, the notion of the knowledge society has been born: a notion built 
on knowledge as capital on the one hand and knowledge as a public good on the other; 
competitiveness on the one hand and community on the other, all fundamental parameters 
of a knowledge society. An intellectual schizophrenia if there ever was one.
So what is the nature of this baby beast known as the knowledge society? It is an 
intensely networked organism comprising multidimensional virtual and physical 
connections between human beings over massively networked infrastructures. It is one 
which places a premium on inquiry, research, creativity, the use of high technology and 
entrepreneurial leadership1. Its key skills are those of literacy, collaboration, innovation, 
communication, diversity and flexibility. Yet it is an entirely inclusive society in which 
traditional obstacles to participation and productivity are removed and which facilitates 
new forms of creativity and new diversities of expression.
These new form s o f  creativity and new diversities o f  expression are key to the realization 
o f knowledge societies as they, in turn, represent the key to preserving the natural 
balance and mix o f  individual capacities and inclinations inherent to the human race.
What are the prerequisites for transformation to a knowledge society?
Taking account of the shop-worn portfolio of primary requisites for ICT-enabled 
development (price, physical and mental disability, basic and digital illiteracy, location, 
etc. etc.) and secondary requisites (regulation as appropriate, health care, physical
'Slater, Robert. Some Human and Social Capital Components That a Knowledge Society Requires. Second 
International Conference on Technology and Society. Hyderabad, India. 12 -  15 December 2005.
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security etc etc.), we can lump the prerequisites for a knowledge society into the 
following categories:
• Adequate infrastructure
• Vibrant and productive business sector
• Absence of traditional obstacles to access
• Meaningful and appropriate services
• Purpose
• Purpose-driven innovations
Together these account for the technological, intellectual and social dynamics previously 
discussed.
The removal of traditional obstacles to access and the development of vibrant business 
communities as well as the provision of adequate infrastructure and meaningful and 
appropriate ICT services have shared centre stage with policy and regulatory reform for 
over a decade. Purpose and purpose-driven innovations have attracted far less attention 
but are equally critical success factors for the transformation to knowledge societies.
Indeed, the transformation to a knowledge society from an information society is far 
more demanding than the transformation to any previous society. This is so because it is 
accompanied not only by phenomenal disruptions of a technological nature but also by 
fundamental philosophical reorientations. These philosophical reorientations derive from 
a commitment to realize productivity from a diverse set of citizens in traditionally 
unfamiliar lifestyles using unfamiliar tools: a far more complex and challenging 
proposition than dispensing food and mosquito nets.
The purpose that is prerequisite to a knowledge society is the expression of possibilities 
that traditional non-participants perceive as interesting, meaningful and satisfying. These 
possibilities must enable different, and new, types of engagement in order to appeal, for 
example, to individuals who would otherwise be engaged in purely non-intellectual tasks 
or those who would not be engaged in productive tasks at all. Purpose-driven innovations 
are those that take specific account of the nature of traditionally excluded citizens, and 
the diversity of nature found in clusters of such individuals, as well as their physical, 
social and cultural circumstances.
The scope of purpose and purpose-driven innovations must of course also relate to a full 
spectrum of regular activities surrounding leisure, health care, etc etc.
What is Trinidad and Tobago’s vision for itself as a knowledge society?
The notion of knowledge society does not figure explicitly in the country’s Vision20202 
which reads:
2GoRTT Vision2020 Vision: http://www.vision2020.gov.tt/process/vision.aspx?id=2137
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By the year 2020, Trinidad and Tobago will be a united, resilient, productive, 
innovative and prosperous nation; with a disciplined, caring, fun-loving society; 
comprising healthy, happy and well-educated people and built on the enduring 
attributes o f  self-reliance, respect, tolerance, equity and integrity; 
in which:
• Every citizen has equal opportunities to achieve his fullest potential;
• A ll citizens enjoy a high quality o f  life, where quality healthcare is available 
to all and where safe, peaceful, environmentally-friendly communities are 
maintained;
• A ll citizens are assured o f  a sound, relevant education system tailored to meet 
the human resource needs o f  a modern, progressive, technologically 
advancing nation;
• Optimum use is made o f  all the resources o f  the nation;
• The family as the foundation o f  the society contributes to its growth, 
development and stability;
• There is respect fo r  the rule o f  law and human rights and the promotion o f  the 
principles o f  democracy;
• The diversity and creativity o f  all its people are valued and nurtured.
However the Vision does capture many of the prerequisite parameters of a knowledge 
society, certainly those that relate to human development. The Draft National Strategic 
Plan3 maps the vision into specific objectives developed around twenty eight key 
sectors4, organized according to six clusters:
• Business and Productive Sectors
• Human Resource Development
• Technology and Innovation
• Health and Environment
• Public Institutions, Public Infrastructure and Housing
• Social Framework
It recognizes five developmental priorities:
• Developing innovative people
• Nurturing a caring society
• Governing effectively
3 GoRTT Vision2020: http://www.vision2020.gov.tt/plans/National Plan.pdf
4Macroeconomy and Finance; Energy; A g ricu ltu re ; Industry and Entrepreneurship; F inanc ia l Services; 
Tourism; N ationa l Security and P ub lic  Safety; In frastructure; Pre-prim ary, P rim ary and Secondary 
Education; Tertiary Education; Skills Development and Train ing; H ealth; Housing; Culture and Attitudes; 
Environment; Poverty A llev ia tion  and Social Services; Governance and Ins titu tiona l Structures fo r  
Development; Science, Technology and Innovation; H IV /A ID S ; Population; Regional Development and 
Sustainable Communities; In te rnationa l Relations, Regional Co-operation and Trade; Labour and Social 
Security; Youth, Sport and Recreation; Gender and Development; Adm in istra tion o f  Justice; Law  
Adm in istra tion and Legal A ffa irs ; Pub lic  U tilitie s
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• Enabling competitive businesses
• Investing in sound infrastructure and environment
Strategies for the enabling of the National Connectivity Agenda, including legal, 
institutional and policy initiatives, are embodied in the National Information and 
Communications Technology Plan, Fastforward.
What are Trinidad and Tobago’s realities?
According to many criteria which matter, Trinidad and Tobago presents little by way of 
unusual challenge for a developing country ultimately transforming to a knowledge 
society. Its land area accounts for approximately 0.004% of the world’s total5 and its 
population accounts for roughly 0.02% of world total6 . The country is blessed with a 
forgiving climate with minimal threat from major natural disasters. The urban/rural split
7 8of households is roughly 76%/24% . Roughly 92% of all households have electricity , 
87% have tvs5, 84% have refrigerators and radios5, 70% have piped water supply5 and 
water borne toilet facilities5, 35% have motor vehicles, 17% have cable service5 and there 
is roughly a 12% Internet penetration rate9 . (Interestingly enough, 42% of our households 
have sewing machines.)
Trinidad and Tobago enjoys relatively low inflation rates and a trade surplus. At the most 
recent count, its Gini index was 40.310 and it ranked 57 of 177 countries in HDI11 
(2003/2005). At the most recent count it fell in the Upper Access group in DAI12 (2002). 
The employment profile13 is dominated by elementary occupations; followed by a close 
tie of clerical, shop sales and service workers. Thereafter, the profile narrows from 
technicians and associate professionals to legislators, senior officials and managers.
There are then roughly equal numbers of professionals as there are craft and related 
workers. Holding up the rear are agricultural, forestry and fishery workers along with 
plant and machine operators and assemblers. Reported unemployment rates are in the 
single digits14 and the reported literacy rate exceeds 99% 15.
5 5,128 km2 of a total of 130490000 km2
6 Taken as at 2000 using figures from the T&T 2000 Census
(http://www.cso.gov.tt/statistics/cssp/census2000/Total_Population_by_Sex_%20Sex_Ratio_and_Area_20 
00.pdf) and ibiblio’s 2000 figures (http://www.ibiblio.org/lunarbin/worldpop)
7 UNICEF: http://www.unicef.org/infobvcountrv/trinidad tobago statistics.html
8 GoRTT CSO: http://cso.gov.tt/statistics/pdf/Table17_HBS.pdf
9 Nov 30 2005 figure from Internet World Stats, http://www.internetworldstats.com/list4.htm
10 Gini index for income inequality takes on values ranging from 0 (representing an equal distribution of 
income) and 100 (representing all income earned by a single individual.) Figure taken from the Human 
Development Report 2005. International cooperation at a crossroad: Aid, trade and security in an unequal 
world. UNDP 2005.
11 The Human Development Index is a summary measure of quality of life (“human development”) which 
takes account of life expectancy at birth, a mix of literacy and enrollment metrics and GDP per capita. 
UNDP 2005 figures based on 2003 figures: 
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2005/pdf/HDR05 complete.pdf
12 The Digital Access Index is a summary measure of ICT access which takes account of infrastructure, 
knowledge, affordability, quality and Internet usage. DAI classifications are High, Upper, Medium and 
Low. ITU: http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press releases/2003/30.html
13 GoRTT CSO: http://cso.gov.tt/files/cms/Labour%20Force%204th%20Qrt%20Bulletin%202005.pdf
14 GoRTT CSO: http://www.cso.gov.tt/
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Pressing social issues in Trinidad and Tobago include crime, inadequate care for the 
poor; domestic violence; a less than mediocre health care system; and inadequate 
educational systems at the primary level and secondary levels. The greatest single 
concern of the average citizen is crime as the country ranks sixth in the world for 
homicide with a per capita rate in 2004 of 20 (260 murders) and in 2005 of 29.69 (386
murders)16.
Key Transformational Imperatives for Trinidad and Tobago
The Draft National Strategic Plan with its accompanying Frameworks for Action together 
with the Fastforward programme and an apparent focus on crime fighting fairly cover the 
basic prerequisites for a knowledge society in Trinidad and Tobago, namely the provision 
of adequate infrastructure, a vibrant and productive business sector; absence of traditional 
obstacles to access and meaningful and appropriate services.
Deeper consideration, however, could perhaps be given to purpose for traditionally 
excluded citizens in the implementation of Vision2020, certainly if part of the evolving 
vision is that of a knowledge society. Abundant and affordable Internet access, computers 
in schools and community access to egovernment services (key aspects of Fastforward) 
do not make a knowledge society. These are surely important elements of the backdrop 
but they must be accompanied by personally motivating opportunities for engagement: 
sports: cricket, football, music, carnival, humour, bacchanal, drama, the oral tradition, 
craft, peekong, all deeply rooted in Trinidad and Tobago culture.
A people-centred vision of a knowledge society contemplates what individual people 
are doing and the extent to which their nature is accommodated and expressed while 
interacting with new and different tools. New forms of creativity and new diversities of 
expression require purpose-driven innovations which will preserve the natural balance 
and mix of individual capacities and inclinations inherent in our people. The development 
of these types of innovations, in turn, should figure strongly in the priorities for national 
research and development.
To transform Trinidad and Tobago to a knowledge society, the educational system from 
preschool to tertiary levels would also require major fundamental and operational 
revisions. And the health of the informal educational sector is as important as that of the 
formal educational sector to the evolution to a knowledge society. A society with a rich 
entrepreneurial culture will derive most benefit from the information age, transforming 
information into knowledge and knowledge into wealth. Such a culture may be 
stimulated in many ways, starting in the toddler years. Much of the stimulation will 
naturally fall to the informal education sector (family, entertainment, play). In this regard, 
direct interventions on the part of government include the facilitation of wholesome
15 Globalis: http://globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?Country=TT&IndicatorID=41
16 Darryl Heeralal. T&T among top 6 homicidal nations. Trinidad and Tobago Express. Monday, April 10th 
2006
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locally-developed edutainment products and family-support systems that encourage early 
childhood learning and exploration, the latter incorporated into Vision2020.
Technology and small business hobbyist groups represent another important government- 
assisted stimulant of an entrepreneurial culture which lies at the heart of a knowledge 
society. Within universities and outside of universities, this is where much of the 
innovation in society originates. At the centre of the knowledge society is the 
entrepreneur who produces maximally valuable applications and services and makes 
these available to society at minimum cost.
Connectivity is also an integral part of the whole picture: connectivity to the Internet yes, 
connectivity to knowledge sources yes, but more importantly, connectivity to people. So 
a crucial aspect of government’s role in transforming Trinidad and Tobago into a 
knowledge society is to facilitate these social connections, also in new and innovative 
ways.
Conclusion
While knowledge societies have and will continue to evolve naturally around 
communities of interest whose shared values relate to enquiry, entrepreneurship and 
creativity, they will not naturally evolve at the country-level without deliberate policy 
and operational interventions. The burden of the transformation will lie heavily on the 
shoulders of government. But this transformation can not rely on traditional 
methodologies or traditional tools. Like knowledge societies themselves, the 
transformation can only be effected through new and innovative means.
Knowledge societies, like their predecessors, are en route to other community life forms. 
Today’s technologies, networks, services, business models, laws, regulations and 
societies are therefore inextricably bound in the same change path.
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In September 2004 the Caribbean Ministers of Telecommunications, directed the 
Caribbean Telecommunications Union (CTU) to establish a Spectrum Management Task 
Force to examine and make recommendations on the following issues:
• Establishment of the infrastructure to manage the wireless environment
• Assessment of the free spectrum
• Un-licensing of specific frequency bands
• Determine the best practices for interference management and frequency 
monitoring
• Appropriate spectrum allocation and assignment approaches
This paper will discuss how the CTU proposes to implement this directive. It will also 
identify the objectives to be achieved by the adoption of a harmonised approach to 
spectrum management particularly in like of the establishment of the Caribbean Single 
Market and Economy and the ever increasing use of wireless technology in the provision 
of new services across the region as the telecommunication sector is liberalized and 
opened to competition. The paper will identify the need to revise spectrum management
SPECTRUM  MANAGEMENT IN SMALL ISLAND DEVELOPING STATES
policies to ensure the most efficient use of the spectrum, encourage investment and to 
satisfy the ever increasing consumer demands in this information age.
THE TECHNOLOGY FACTOR
When wireless telecommunications services were first introduced at the turn of the 
twentieth century, the assignment of radio frequencies was based essentially on 
eliminating interference. The then immature technology did not have the intelligence 
capabilities to discriminate between frequencies with precision. Existing spectrum 
management policies have been based on the capabilities of the early wireless 
technologies and have remained unchanged for almost a century.
Over the last decade there has been rapid technological innovation in the wireless 
industry which has produced intelligent wireless devices that utilize spectrum in 
fundamentally new ways, largely minimising the interference concerns and enabling 
greater use of radio frequencies.
Over the last two decades the only use made of radio in the use of ICT was for point-to- 
point connections to connect network facilities operated by telecom companies. Such use 
went unnoticed by consumers. However today, radio is widely used to provide a variety 
of services directly to the consumer. These services include wireless LANs and WANs, 
mobile phones and accessories such as wireless mice, loudspeakers, headsets, wireless 
access to motor cars, gates and barriers.
The pace of policy development and attendant legislative and regulatory reform in the 
Caribbean has not kept in step with the rapid evolution in wireless technologies. As a 
result, the traditional methods for spectrum management have become impractical and
inefficient in the context of new technologies and could be a barrier to entry for 
prospective investors.
THE CARIBBEAN CHALLENGE
The Caribbean covers an area of approximately 2million km2, with island and 
continental states, democracies and colonial dependencies; countries ranging in size from 
261 km2 to 110, 000 km2 Populations range from less than 50, 000 to 8 million across 
the region. GDP per Capita ranges from US$1,600 in the poorest nations to US$16,000 
in wealthier nations. English, French, Spanish and Dutch are spoken along with several 
hundred dialects.
This diversity of the nations in the Caribbean gives rise to a number of constraints and 
points to some critical needs as regards spectrum management. These constraints are:
1. Limited financial and human resources for effective regional spectrum 
management
2. Insufficient experienced persons trained in spectrum management
3. Inadequate institutional arrangements to deal with the evolving spectrum 
issues resulting from the proliferation of wireless technologies
4. Insufficient information on spectrum management best practices
5. Lack of central coordination of spectrum management in the Caribbean
6. Small island economies and markets
7. Independently evolving regulatory practices
MEETING THE CHALLENGES
The following summarises the technological, regulatory and economic issues enumerated 
above which all point to an urgent need for training, review, reform and harmonization of 
policies and techniques for spectrum management in the Caribbean:
Today’s wireless technologies are more sophisticated and efficient in their use 
of spectrum and traditional spectrum management policies in use in the region
are limiting the speed of proliferation and access to the benefits of these 
technologies e.g. new services, increased accessibility
• The rapidly evolving innovations challenge both regulators and administrators 
in their ability to understand and be informed on the technological 
developments and best practices
• The use of radio frequency spectrum does not respect national or regional 
boundaries. Consequently, there is a need for Caribbean nations to cooperate in 
the methodologies to be employed in managing spectrum usage.
• The diverse regulatory structures and institutions for spectrum management in 
the region limit opportunities for regulators in individual countries to benefit 
from regional cooperation and practical experience as markets are progressively 
liberalised
• Existing outmoded spectrum policies and practices are delaying response to the 
increasing demand for spectrum-based services and devices
• Existing spectrum management policies and practices could prove to be barriers 
to the smooth functioning of the CSME as they pose challenges to the cost 
effective entry of new players into the telecommunications market and 
obstacles to the timely provision of new services to the market
Policy makers, regulators, technicians must first be educated in the technologies and best
practices for all aspects of spectrum management. This will equip them with the
understanding to enable them to devise a new harmonized policy environment which
reflects the increasingly dynamic and innovative wireless technologies and eliminates
regulatory barriers to increased spectrum use. Once implemented, the new policies will
facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for private sector investment.
EXECUTING THE MANDATE
The CTU advocates the development of a harmonized Spectrum Management Policy 
Framework for the Caribbean in order to establish an environment of regulatory certainty 
that would encourage private sector participation and investment in the 
telecommunication sector and the use of innovative technologies in the provision of 
advanced services in the region.
• Greater levels of Expertise
The project will increase awareness about spectrum management issues and will 
produce a group of practitioners who are trained in the discipline of spectrum 
management who are able to execute the necessary functions within their 
administrations in compliance with international standards.
• Caribbean Frequency Assignment Database.
Following the fieldwork, a comprehensive database of frequency allocations will 
be established
• Caribbean Policy Framework
The project will result in a document that presents a harmonised Caribbean Policy 
Framework for spectrum management, licensing and assignment and best 
practices and approaches to be adopted by the region.
• Caribbean Spectrum Management Task Force
Through the Consultation sessions, a Caribbean Spectrum Management Task 
Force will be established which will facilitate the formulation of the Policy 
document during the project. Thereafter, the Task force will address on-going 
spectrum management issues for the region and develop Caribbean positions on 
spectrum issues and represent the Caribbean at international fora.
• An enabling Environment
The project will foster an environment of regulatory certainty that would 
encourage private sector participation and investment in the telecommunication 
sector.
STATUS
The current status of the work undertaken by the CTU is as follows:
• We have conducted two workshops. One for technocrats in October 2004 and 
the other a Policy Consultation and Workshop in March 2006. This 
Consultation was also webcast and attracted an additional one hundred online 
participants in addition to the thirty actually attending the event in Antigua
• Online training modules for technician are currently being developed for 
deliver online targeted to begin by the end of July 2006
• We are currently evaluating bids for the conduct of spectrum field audits in a 
minimum of eight countries across the region
• Funding for these activities is being provided by ProInvest and CIDA.
• Establishing the Steering Committee and Spectrum Task Force
The execution of the project will result in:
CONCLUSIONS
The advantages to be derived by harmonizing the approach to spectrum management 
regionally are:
• Minimizing inter-service interference between countries
• Ensuring compatibility of services between countries
• Reduced cost of terminal equipment due to the economies of scale
• Greater consumer satisfaction and flexibility in use of terminal equipment
• The potential for simplified type approval and equipment certification 
processes.
• Facilitating the concept of a seamless Caribbean capable of attracting 
investment in the sector.
• A unified Caribbean voice in the international arena such as the World Radio 
Conference.
• Improved investment climate.
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• Establishm ent of Legal and Regulatory Fram ework
• Establishm ent of an Independent Regulator
• Competition effectively introduced in all m arkets 
(‘Flashcut’) for the benefit of consum ers
> Reduced Prices
> Improved Customer Service
> Improved Quality and Wider Variety of Services
• Expansion of Network Infrastructure to effect an Increase 
in ICT U sage
L e g a l  a n d  R e g u l a t o r y  F r a m e w o r k
• T e le c o m m u n ic a t io n s  A u th o r ity  o f  T r in id a d  
a n d  T o b a g o  ( T A T T )
> Independent Regulator
>C ollegiate Body (11 Board M em bers & Executive)
>  R esponsible for Granting Licences
>  Minister responsible for Policy and Granting 
C oncessions
Legal and Regulatory Framework
• Most Critical Regulatory Instrum ents for Liberalisation 
identified
>  Authorisation Fram ework
> Interconnection and A ccess to Facilities Policy & Regs.
>  Spectrum  M anagem ent Policy
>  Radio Regulations
>  Fee M ethodology and Regulations
>  Numbering Plan
> Dispute Resolution P rocedures
>  BWA
• R e g u la to r y  In s tru m e n ts  to  b e  d e v e lo p e d  o v e r  
n e x t 2  m o n th s
> C onsum er Rights & Obligations Policy and Regulations
>  Quality of Service Policy and Regulations
>  Competition Policy and Regulations
>  Pricing Policy and Regulations
>  Enforcem ent, Com pliance and Dispute Resolution 
Fram ework
> Universality Fram ework 
-  Num ber Portability
L e g a l  a n d  R e g u l a t o r y  F r a m e w o r k
Legal and Regulatory Framework
Technology Neutral Authorisations
• C o n c e s s io n s
>O peration of Public Telecom m unications Networks 
>Provision of Public Telecom m unications Services 
> Provision of B roadcasting Services
• L ic e n c e s
> Installation, Operation or U se of Radiocom m unication 
Equipm ent
L e g a l  a n d  R e g u l a t o r y  F r a m e w o r k
Concession Classifications
Type 1 Network Only
Type 2 Network and Telecom Services (Service Neutral)
Type 3 Virtual Network and Telecom Services (Service Neutral)
Type 4 Telecom Services Only (Specific Services)
Type 5 Broadcasting Services Only
Fee Structure
• C o n c e s s io n  R e g u la to r y  C h a r g e
> Administrative C harge (Activity-Based)
>  Operational C harge (R evenue-B ased)
(% Total Industry Revenue * TATT’s Operating Costs)
• L ic e n c e  R e g u la to r y  C h a r g e
>  A dm inistrative C harge  (Activity-Based)
>  Spectrum  U sage C harge
• Economic Rent
• Efficient Usage (Discount Factors)
Numbering Plan
• C oncession Obligation
• A ddresses H NI Issue
> Only local HNIs allowed
• N um bering Fees
> To encourage efficient usage of numbers
N um ber Type Fee
Mobile Twenty cents (20 0)
Fixed Ten cents (10 0)
Special Thirty Five cents (35 0)
Short Codes (e.g. N11, 999, 990) No charge
Current Market Status
Market Status
Domestic Mobile Three operators
Domestic Fixed Voice Two operators
International
8 licensed operators
Approx. 115 Int’l Call Centre Operators
Cable TV 1 major territorial operator , 1 Minor territorial 
operator
Approx. 7 Niche providers
M obile  S p e c tru m  P lan
> Incum bent assigned  un-paired mobile spectrum  
(800MHz/1800MHz)
> Inefficient utilization in 800 MHz band
> N on-contiguous assignm ents  in 1800 MHz band
> Existing assignm ents in 900 MHz band for fixed services
> 800MHz/1900MHz band plan
> Migration Plan for Incum bent
L i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  D o m e s t i c  M o b i l e  M a r k e t
L ib e r a lis a t io n  o f  D o m e s t ic  F ix e d  M a r k e t
• F ix e d  W ire d  C a b le  T V  N e tw o r k s / S e r v ic e s
> First-Com e First-Served p rocess
>  R ecom m endations m ade to Minister
• 1 National Type 1,5 Concession
• 1 National Type 2,5 Concession
• 1 Niche Type 2,5 Concession
• F ix e d  W ir e le s s  A c c e s s  N e tw o r k s / S e r v ic e s
> Availability vs. Dem and
> Spectrum  Planning
> Competitive Selection P ro cess  to be determ ined
• In te rn a t io n a l N e tw o rk  a n d /  o r  S e r v ic e s
> Competitive Selection Process: Com parative 
Evaluation
> R ecom m endations m ade to Minister
• 2 Type 1 Concessions (Network Only)
• 3 Type 2 Concessions (Network and Services)
• In te rn a t io n a l S e r v ic e s  o n ly
> Regularisation of International Call C entres
>  Com parative Evaluation P rocess
L i b e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  M a r k e t
C h a lle n g e s
• Insufficient Transitional Provisions in the A ct
>TATT expected  to perform from Day 1 after promulgation
> Limited EX ANTE REGULATORY POW ERS
C O N S T R A IN T  IN EXERCISE OF DEVELOPMENTAL 
FUNCTION 
>SLO W  LEGISLATIVE PR O C ESS
• IN S U F F IC IE N T  H U M A N  R E S O U R C E S
• R E G U L A T O R Y  IN D E P E N D E N C E
• D E V IS IN G  A  W A Y  T O  M A K E  O P T IM U M  U S E  
O F  T E L E C O M M U N IC A T IO N S  T A L E N T S  IN  
T H E  C O U N T R Y
C h a l l e n g e s
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Introduction:
The UK’s Strategic Review of Telecommunications
In 2005 the UK’s new telecoms regulator, Ofcom, published its Strategic Review of 
Telecommunications, a fundamental review of the country’s 25-year experiment with 
the liberalisation of telecommunications. This review is being eagerly digested in 
countries around the world.
This experiment began in 1984 with the privatisation of the former monopolist 
incumbent, BT, and the introduction of competition in the services market. 
Simultaneously, both Japan and the US also liberalised their telecoms markets, thus 
stimulating a global wave of telecoms liberalisation that would change the face of the 
global Telecoms Industry. But how successful has this experiment been? This 
question will be examined in this paper with respect to the UK.
A Historical Compromise:
Ofcom’s “New Regulatory Approach” for fixed communications
On the 23rd June 2005 Ofcom, the UK telecoms regulator, announced a historical 
“new regulatory approach” to fixed communications in the country, ending a period 
of about eighteen months of soul-searching, analysis, consultation and negotiation 
involving the major stakeholders with an interest in the UK telecoms industry. This 
approach represents a historical compromise with consensus being achieved amongst 
the regulator, the incumbent (BT), the main competitors to BT, and groups of what 
Ofcom called ‘citizen-consumers’. The announcement received broad support from 
these stakeholders, a rare achievement in an industry notable for its significant 
conflicts of interest.
The announcement marked the culmination of a fundamental “strategic review” 
undertaken by Ofcom, the second crucial review of the industry since the 
liberalisation of telecoms (and the privatisation of BT) in1984. As a result of both the 
depth and the rigour of the review, Ofcom’s moves have been closely watched by 
other countries and their regulators who also confront similar circumstances and 
problems to those encountered in the UK.
Ofcom’s achievement is rare precisely because of the conflicts of interest that 
characterise the telecoms industry, not only in the UK but in virtually all countries. In 
almost all countries the provision of telecoms services was until the 1980s and 1990s 
the responsibility of a national monopoly (often referred to, for analytical reasons, as
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a natural monopoly). However, from the 1980s and 1990s -  after the liberalisation of 
telecoms in Japan, the US and UK in the mid-1980s -  the conventional wisdom 
changed. Henceforth, governments and their regulators introduced competition into 
the industry in the belief that this would result in a more efficient industrial outcome.
However, for a number of reasons, despite the existence of competition, the 
incumbent telecoms operators continued to exercise what regulators called 
‘significant market power’ in several important markets (referred to as ‘bottlenecks’). 
In these areas in particular conflicts between the incumbents and their competitive 
rivals continued despite the efforts of regulators to ensure the establishment of 
competitive markets. These conflicts were triangular, involving regulator and 
incumbent, incumbent and competitors, and competitors and regulator.
But the prevalence of this conflict raises an important puzzle: How was Ofcom able 
to achieve a historical compromise between the conflicting parties given the 
fundamental nature of the conflicts? A key further question is whether other countries 
such as Japan might be able to achieve a similar historical compromise.
In the following subsection this puzzle is answered. An understanding of the answer 
is necessary background in order to make sense of the processes that led to the 
achievement of the historical compromise.
How was Ofcom able to achieve its ‘Historical Compromise’?1
The key point to understand is that Ofcom assumed its regulatory powers from 
January 2004 at a time of crisis (crisis is not too strong a word) for the UK Telecoms 
Industry. Indeed, the demise of the former regulator, Oftel, and its replacement by the 
‘super-regulator’ Ofcom was largely a response to this crisis.
The reason for the crisis was two-fold. First, it was clear that competition was not 
working in this industry. Although it was hoped that new competitors -  sometimes 
called the alternative network operators or altnets -  would enter the industry and 
would compete successfully with the incumbent, BT, the Telecoms Bust from March 
2000 put paid to this hope. The ensuing lack of finance for the new competitors and 
their resulting financial woes reduced the competitive pressure on BT.
Furthermore, there was widespread agreement by the new competitors that where they 
needed access to BT’s network, or where they depended on BT’s wholesale products, 
they were not being given the same access that BT Retail was getting from its parent. 
In the language that Ofcom subsequently adopted, there was not ‘equivalent’ access.
In part this was due to regulatory failure, that is a failure on the part of Oftel to take a 
sufficiently tough line with BT. This failure was admitted by the then head of Oftel, 
David Edmonds. In a remarkably frank interview with the Financial Times, David 
Edmonds, Oftel’s Director General, admitted that he was himself responsible for 
some serious mistakes. In his own words:
This section is based on my personal interviews with senior members of both Ofcom and BT.
2
“If I knew then what I know now I would have handled local loop 
unbundling differently. I should have realised earlier that BT was playing 
a long game. My hope was that the industry would work it out for itself.”2
According to the Financial Times, “he said the lesson from these mistakes
was to be more ‘directive’”.
The second dimension to the crisis was that it was becoming clear to the stakeholders 
in the UK Telecoms Industry that Britain was not performing as well as its peers. 
This was true not only in comparison to the European leaders but even more so
compared to the global leaders. For example, in the field of broadband, that had
become a politically sensitive indicator of the success of government and regulatory 
policy, although the UK was performing reasonably well in terms of retail prices, its 
comparative global performance in terms of speed was relatively poor. Furthermore, 
the UK was falling behind the global leaders in terms of the diffusion of superior 
technologies, particularly FTTH, and new services.
As a result of this crisis there was a general feeling amongst the stakeholders that 
‘something needs to be done’. BT too was aware of this feeling and realised that it 
would have to compromise. To continue along the previous road was impossible. 
Ofcom had made it clear, from even before it officially assumed power, that it would 
not allow BT a ‘continue as before’ option. It was these circumstances that created 
the conditions for the emergence of a new regulatory regime in the UK.
But other factors also helped to make a new regulatory regime possible. Of these, two 
factors were particularly important. The first was the emergence of a new regulatory 
organisation -  Ofcom -  with new leaders. This created a sense that fundamental 
issues could be examined afresh and new solutions explored. Ofcom added 
significantly to this feeling with its immediate announcement that it would embark on 
a ‘Strategic Review’ of the telecoms industry, the most important since the Duopoly 
Review in 1991, itself the first major review since the privatisation of BT and the 
liberalisation of the telecoms sector. A consensus quickly emerged that the time had 
come to ‘stand back and take stock’.
Personality factors also played a role, the second factor shaping things to come. 
Ofcom managed to recruit extremely talented leaders. In particular, Ofcom recruited 
Stephen Carter as its CEO and Lord David Currie as its Chairman. Stephen Carter 
was very knowledgeable about the converging telecoms and broadcasting industries, 
having been CEO of one of the UK’s two cable TV companies, ntl (which had just 
been through a major financial crisis in the wake of the Telecoms Bust from 2000). 
As in industry leader, Carter was able to see things not only from a bureaucratic- 
regulatory point of view but also from a business perspective. David Currie was a 
distinguished academic economist who had played a prominent role in the analysis 
and discussion of economic issues in the UK and who had occupied prominent 
positions at the London Business School and City University. He had a sophisticated 
understanding both of industry and regulatory issues. Talented people such as these 
were willing to join the new super-regulator largely because they sensed that with 
convergence extremely important changes were occurring in the communications and
2 Financial Times, August 11, 2003.
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broadcasting and related industries and they were keen to play an important role in 
shaping future developments. The attractive salaries offered by the new regulator 
added to their incentive.
BT too had undergone leadership changes. The fallout from the Telecoms Bust after 
2000 led to the ousting of the two BT leaders who had taken the company through the 
Telecoms Boom, namely Sir Peter Bonfield who was CEO and Sir Iain Vallence, the 
Chairman. On February 1, 2002 Ben Verwaayen, a Dutchman, formerly vice 
chairman of the US telecoms equipment company, Lucent Technologies, took over as 
CEO of BT. Being both pragmatic and forceful, Verwaayen quickly realised, not only 
that BT would have to compromise, but even more importantly that with reasonable 
people on the other side of the negotiating table a window of opportunity had been 
created which could leave BT in an advantageous position.
The main carrot that Ofcom was holding out -  a carrot that Verwaayen wanted to 
taste -  was the twin prospects of the removal of regulation in BT’s non-SMP 
(significant market power) markets and greater regulatory certainty in its SMP 
markets. Furthermore, Ofcom was also acknowledging that BT was entitled to a 
‘reasonable rate of return’ on its new investments in next generation networks, 
including a risk-adjusted cost of capital in determining its network charges.
Very soon a trust-based relationship developed between Carter and Currie from 
Ofcom and Verwaayen from BT. The new regulators, relatively clear about what they 
wanted from BT (and helped by the experience of David Edmonds, the former head of 
Oftel who remained with Ofcom), quickly came to the conclusion that it was better to 
negotiate with BT rather than attempt to rule it by arm’s-length directives. 
Verwaayen’s pragmatism and willingness to compromise undoubtedly helped to make 
the negotiation option (rather than threat) viable. My interviews in both Ofcom and 
BT made it clear that a good trust-based relationship soon developed between these 
people.
Although some of BT’s competitors were initially suspicious about the closeness 
between Ofcom and BT (as my interviews with some of their leaders revealed), they 
soon came to realise and appreciate that this relationship did not amount to 
‘regulatory capture’ by BT. Clearly, Ofcom was taking a tough line with BT -  
notably threatening the incumbent with referral under the Enterprise Act and the 
possibility of break-up -  and it was genuinely committed to ensuring that as much 
competition took place in the evolving UK Telecoms Industry as possible.
Furthermore, the process adopted by Ofcom also encouraged trust on the part of BT’s 
competitors. This process was clear and transparent. First, Ofcom made clear the 
fundamental principles on which its regulation would be based. Secondly, it made 
explicit the problems that it had identified as needing remedies. Thirdly, it clarified 
the options that it felt it had. Fourthly -  and this was crucial in terms of winning and 
retaining the trust of the competitors -  it consulted widely with both BT’s competitors 
and other stakeholders including consumer-citizens. They were all given the 
opportunity to respond to Ofcom’s consultation documents. Crucially, the 
stakeholders felt that Ofcom was genuinely open to their views.
4
The result of these circumstances was that when on 23rd June 2005 Ofcom finally 
officially announced the details of its new regulatory regime for the UK telecoms 
industry -  including the ‘undertakings’ that BT had offered as part of this new regime 
-  there was almost universal support for its proposals.
5
O fcom ’s  ‘Strategic R eview ’ 
of te leco m s. 2 0 0 4 / 5
Martin Fransman 
Professor of Economics and Founder-Director 
Institute for Japanese-European Technology Studies 
University of Edinburgh
Sign ifican ce  o f  O fcom  R eview
• M o s t  im p o r ta n t  re v ie w  o f  te le c o m s  s in c e  
B T  w a s  p r iv a t is e d  in 1 9 8 4 .
• S in c e  th e  d i le m m a s  fa c e d  in U K  a re  
c o m m o n  to  rich  c o u n tr ie s , th e  O fc o m  
r e v ie w  h a s  b e e n  c lo s e ly  w a tc h e d  in o th e r  
c o u n tr ie s .
The Problem s Identified by 
Ofcom
• C o m p e tit io n  h a s  n o t b e e n  w o rk in g  
a d e q u a te ly  in th e  U K .
• T h e  n e e d  to  d e v e lo p  g lo b a lly  c o m p e tit iv e  
a l l - IP  N e x t -G e n e r a t io n  N e tw o rk s  (d e f in e d  
a s  n e tw o rk s  th a t  g o  b e y o n d  th e  
c a p a b ilit ie s  o f  e x is t in g  c o p p e r , c a b le , a n d  
w ir e le s s  n e tw o rk s ) .
Why has Competition not been  
Working?
• Cable competitors to telcos have been fragmented and financially 
weak (cf US).
• Altnets have not sufficiently challenged BT. (Reasons: BT’s vertical 
integration advantages and economies of scale and scope; financial 
markets un-enthusiastic about altnets since 2000; BT has got 
smarter and more efficient; generally, high fixed costs and low 
marginal costs.)
• BT has dragged its feet and failed to provide ‘equivalence’ (i.e. 
equal access to BT Retail and its competitors).
• Therefore Ofcom concluded: Current UK Telecoms Market is 
Unsustainable.
Oftel’s  Frank A d m ission
In a  rem arkably frank interview with the Financial Times, 
David E d m o n d s. O ftel’s  D irec to r G e n e ra l, adm itted 
that he w as himself responsible for som e serious 
m istakes. In his own words:
"If I knew then w hat I know now I would have handled local 
loop unbundling differently. I should have realised 
earlier that BT w as playing a  long gam e. My hope w as 
that the industry would work it out for itself.”[1]
According to the Financial Times, "he said th e  le s s o n  from  
th e s e  m is ta k e s  w a s  to  be  m o re  ‘d irec tiv e ’”.
[1] Financial Times, A ugust 11, 2003.
O fcom ’s  7 Key Regulatory 
Principles
• 1. "promote co m p etitio n  a t th e  d e e p e s t  lev e ls  of 
in fra s tru c tu re  w here it will be effective and sustainable;
• 2. focus regulation to deliver eq u ality  o f a c c e s s  
b e y o n d  th o s e  levels;
• 3. a s  soon a s  competitive conditions allow, w ithd raw  
from  reg u la tio n  a t o th e r  levels;
• 4. prom ote a  fa v o u ra b le  c lim ate  fo r effic ien t an d  
tim ely  in v e s tm e n t a n d  s tim u la te  innovation , in
particular by ensuring a  consisten t and transparen t 
regulatory approach;
O fcom ’s  7 Key Regulatory 
Principles
• 5. accom m odate  vary in g  reg u la to ry  s o lu tio n s  for
different products and, w here appropriate, different 
geographies;
• 6. c rea te  scope  for m ark e t en try  that could, over time, 
rem ove econom ic bottlenecks; and
• 7. in the wider com m unications value chain, unless 
there  a re  enduring econom ic bottlenecks, adopt light- 
to u c h  e co n o m ic  reg u la tio n  b ased  on competition law 
and the promotion of interoperability.”
O fcom  Identified 3  O ptions
• C om plete  de-reg u la tion .
• R eferen ce  of BT under the Enterprise A c t.
• R equire BT to provide full ‘functional 
eq u iva len ce ’ to com petitors (in term s of 
w holesale  products, prices, and processes).
A f t e r  c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  s t a k e h o l d e r s ,  O p t i o n  3  
w a s  c h o s e n .
A Historical Compromise: 
Ofcom’s “New Regulatory 
Framework” for the UK
• BT will create  a new  business unit, A ccess  
S ervices Division (O p e n rea c h ), that will provide  
access to B T ’s S M P /b o ttlen eck  access network  
(i.e. not replicable in the m edium -term ).
• O penreach  will be separated  physically and  
organisationally from BT Group, and its 
governan ce and incentives will be aligned to the  
objective of providing equivalence.
A Historical Compromise: 
Ofcom’s “New Regulatory 
Framework” for the UK
• B T  w ill o f fe r  le g a lly  b in d in g  “U n d e r ta k in g s ” 
in lin e  w ith  O fc o m ’s R e g u la to r y  P r in c ip le s .
• In re tu rn , O fc o m  h a s  o ffe re d  d e -re g u la t io n  
in c o m p e tit iv e  m a rk e ts , c o n t in g e n t  o n  B T ’s  
d e liv e ry  (e .g . le a s e d  lin e s , la rg e  b u s in e s s  
m a rk e t ) .
Why w as Ofcom able to achieve  
a Historical Com prom ise?
• S en se  of crisis in U K  telecom s around 2002-4 ; 
e.g. U K  performing relatively poorly in 
broadband.
• C onsensus that ‘som ething has to be done ’.
• R elative failure of Oftel (O fcom ’s predecessor).
• BT knew  action would be taken, therefore it w as  
willing to com prom ise; new  BT leadership.
• O fcom  w as  a new  regulator (from 2 0 0 4 ) with 
new  leadership (from business and academ ia).
The Problem of Next-Generation 
Networks (NGNs)
• Incentivising investm ent in N G N s by
incum bents. (Regulatory contradiction: the greater the 
competition using incumbent’s NGN, the lower the incentive to 
invest.)
• Allowing incum bent a ‘reasonable  rate of return’.
• Ensuring that the design of N G N  by the  
incum bent does not foreclose on com petition.
• Special problem  of developing F T T H .
Ofcom ’s  Solutions to NGN 
Problem s
• Calculating the ‘risk-adjusted cost of cap ita l’ 
(using ‘equity b e ta ’ from C A P M ) and allowing a 
reasonable  m argin over it.
• Insisting that BT develop its N G N  in accordance  
with O fco m ’s 7 Regulatory Princip les.
• Insisting that BT consult in designing and  
im plem enting its N G N .
Ofcom ’s  Solutions to NGN 
Problem s
• O fc o m  c o n s id e r in g  o p tio n s  s u c h  a s  
‘fo r b e a r a n c e  w ith  c o n te s ta b il ity ’ .
• F u r th e r  s tra te g ic  r e v ie w  th a t  w ill c o n s id e r  
th e  N G N  a c c e s s  n e tw o rk  ( in c lu d in g  th e  
p o s s ib le  tra n s it io n  to  F T T H ) .
• In c lu d in g  th e  ro le  o f  n o n -te lc o s  in th e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  N G N  a c c e s s  n e tw o rk .
C o n clu sio n s
• UK experience show s that two d e ca d e s  after the 
liberalisation of telecom s the authorities have still not got 
it right!
• US lag in broadband leads to the sam e  conclusion!
• While perform ance in Asia (Japan  and Korea) is much 
better, their firms a re  suffering!
• For m ore details s e e  Fransm an, M. Global Broadband  
Battles: W hy Asia Leads while the U S and Europe Lag 
(Stanford University P ress, 2006)!!
MY QUESTIONS ARISING
1. Should the regulator be required to specify the 
c o n d itio n s  th a t  m u s t b e  m et fo r reg u la tio n  to  be  
re d u c e d  o r  w ith d raw n ?
2. Should the regulator ensu re  that firms earn  a 
‘re a so n a b le  ra te  o f re tu rn ’ in re g u la ted  m a rk e ts
and, if so, how should this be defined and calculated?
3. Should the regulator u s e  th e  c a r ro t (i.e. in cen tiv es)
a s  well a s  the stick (i.e. imposition) in regulating firms 
with significant m arket power (SM P)?
